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tion without weakening his other right to relief. 13
Several states have adopted statutes which require an express agreement to condone acts constituting the cause for
divorce on the grounds of cruelty. 14 Under such statutes express forgiveness in cases of cruelty is required, 15 and acts of
sexual intercourse alone are not enough to establish the defense of condonation.16 The law of condonation in North
Dakota is governed by such a statute,17 which requires in
cases of cruelty, an express agreement to condone the of-

fense.18
It is submitted that the result reached by the majority in
the instant case was the correct one; as implying forgiveness
as a matter of public policy will not save a marriage which
has all but failed. Of course, divorce should not be encouraged
nor allowed without cogent proof of marital discord; but in
the same vein the defense of condonation should be one that
must be established by more than mere physical acts, of the
parties without any intent to restore conjugal rights.
PAUL

A.

MUEHILER

RELEASE-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-JOINT TORTFEA-

SORS-The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which
was involved in a collision with defendant's truck. The release
he gave to the driver of the automobile recited the release
of the driver and any and all other persons of any and every
claim or cause of action arising out of the collision. The plaintiff later brought an action against the defendant as a joint
tort-feasor. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, two justices dissenting, that under the Uniform Contribution Among
13. Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 603 (1951) (stating that the
patient endurance by one spouse of the ill-treatment of the other should
never be allowed to weaken his or her right to relief); Fansler v. Fansler,
344 Mich. 569, 75 N.W.2d 1 (1956).
14. Am example of such an enactment is: Cal. Civil Code § 118. "Where
the cause of divorce consists of a course of offensive conduct, or arises, in
cases of cruelty, from excessive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggregately, constitute the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts
constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to
condone."
15. Whinnery v. Whinnery, 21 Cal. App. 59, 130 Pac. 1065 (1913); Brennan v. Brennan, 183 Ore. 269, 192 P.2d 858 (1948).
16. Schletewitz v. Schletewitz, 85 Cal. App. 2d 366, 193 P.2d 34 (1948).
17. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-13 (1961). . . . .When the cause of divorce
consists of a course of offensive conduct or arises in cases of cruelty from
successive acts of ill treatment, which aggregately may consitute the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness shall not
be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause,
unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone."
18. Fleck v. Fleck, 79 N.D. 561, 58 N.W.2d 765 (1953).

1962]

RECENT CASES

Joint Tortfeasors Act 1 the release extinguished the defendant's
liability. Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 172 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1961).
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act in Pennsylvania, this jurisdiction had
ruled that a release of one joint tortfeasor operated as a release of the other joint tortfeasors, even though it was intended that the other wrongdoer should not thereby be released. 2 A number of other jurisdictions also followed this
strict common law rule.3 The reason given was one single injury could have but one satisfaction and the release, being
most strictly construed against the releasor, is conclusive evidence of satisfaction. 4 Jurisdictions finding this rule too harsh
have held that a joint tortfeasor will not be discharged in the
presence of an express reservation of rights.5 The rule that
a mere covenant not to sue one joint tortfeasor does not relieve the remaining tortfeasor's liability is a further narrowing
of the scope of the common law rule. 6
The modern view, which further repudiates the common
law rule, makes the intention of the parties to the release the
test of whether or not the other joint tortfeasors not parties
thereto are affected. 7 Some jurisdictions test whether the release was intended as full satisfaction of the releasor's entire
claim., This test is supplemented by the rule that, in general,
release imports such compensation. 9 Without adoption of the
Uniform Act itself, statutes have been enacted specifying that
the release of one joint tortfeasor does not release others. 10
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2085 (1959). "A release by the injured person
of one joint tortfeasor, whether before of after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but reduces
the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration
paid for the release..."
2. Union of Russian Society v. Koss, 348 Pa. 574. 36 A.2d 433 (1944).
3. Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy Inc., 112 F. Supp. 696 (D.C.N.C. 1953); Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956); Davidow v. Seyforth, 58 So.
2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Short v. Hudson Supply and Equipment Co., 191 Va.
306, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950); Getzenlaner v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 52
Wash. 2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089 (1958).
4. Abb v. Northern Pac, Ry., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954 (1902).
5. Devy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); Liouzis v.
Corliss, 94 N.H. 377, 54 A.2d 365 (1947); Garke v. Holloran, 150 Ohio St.
476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948); see Connelly v. United States Steel Co., 161 Ohio
St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
6. Fagerhey v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co., 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P.2d 1022 (1937);
Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 155 P.2d 633 (1945); Martin v. Burney,
160 Fla. 183, 34 So. 2d 36 (1948); Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Ore. 128, 253 P.2d
897 (1953).
7. Daniel v. Turner, 320 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1959); Gronquist v. Olson. 242
Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Welden v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 84
So. 2d 796 (1956); Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (1930).
8. Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H. 568, 171 At]. 774 (1934); Burke v. Burnham,
97 N.H. 203, 84 A.2d 918 (1951); Fitzgerald v. Union Stockyards, 89 Neb.
393, 131 N.W. 612 (1911).
9. Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H. 568, 171 Atl. 774 (1934); Burke v. Burnham,
97 N.H. 203, 84 A.2d 918 (1951).
10. W. Va. Code Ann. § 5481 (1961). Effect of Statute discussed In Hardin
v. New York Cent. 'R.R., 116 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 1960).
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The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,
adopted in nine states," also reverses the common law
rule. 12 The basic purpose of the Act is to achieve a "sharing of
common responsibility according to equity and natural justice". 1 3 The Act does not create new liability in tort, but merely creates the right to contribution among those already liable.
Recourse is now allowed by the injured party against the tortfeasors remaining after the release for their pro-rata shares, 1'
unless said tortfeasors were specifically discharged.16
Whether a release of one joint tortfeasor would release all
in North Dakota has not been decided by the courts. Inasmuch
as the Act was designed to reverse the common law rule,17 the
adoption of the Act by the Legislature"' would indicate that
release of all tortfeasors would require a release specifically
stating the same. A release in the general terms used in this
case would appear not to. come within the spirit and letter of
the Act.
DAVID E. NETHING

TORT-PARENT AND CHILD-CHILD'S RIGHT TO SUE PAR-

ENT-An unemancipated minor child brought an action
against her father for personal injuries sustained by his simple negligence in the driving of an automobile in which the
child was a passenger. The Superior Court granted the father's
motion for a summary judgement and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court. The Court, in
a split decision, invoked the parental immunity doctrine. It
held that an unemancipated minor child could no maintain a
cause of action against her father. Proceeding further, the
Court held that even though the father had an automobile
liability policy obligating his insurer to pay all sums for which
he was legally responsible, the Suit could not be maintained.
The three dissenting justices, advocating the general harshness and injustice of the rule, prayed for its overthrow. Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1960).
11.
Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
Ginoza v. Takai, 40 Hawaii 691 (1955); Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132,
12.
48 A.2d 353 (1946).
13.
Judson v. Peoples Branch and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
Steger v. Egyud, 219 Md. 331, 149 A.2d 762 (1959).
14.
Daugherty v. Herskberger, 386 Pa- 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
15.
16.
Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 273, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959) (dictum).
17.
Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132, 48 A.2d 353 (1946).

18.

N.D. Cent. Code

§ 32-38-04

(1961).

